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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MIDWEST REALTY, a Utah
Corporation,

)
)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,)
•

"

.

.

.

'

•

vs *

.

)

•

Case No. 13874
•

•

•

)
•

•

'

CITY OF WEST JORDAN,

.

) •

••

)
)

' • ' .

Defendant-Appellant. )

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The action was brought by the Plaintiff against the
Defendant seeking recovery of $20,134.35 owing on a
pay back contract entered into by the parties.

Under the

contract, the City was to reimburse the Plaintiff for the
cost of constructing a sewer main leading from the end of
the City's isystem to the Plaintiff's two subdivisions.
The repayment was to be at the rate of $1.50 per connection,
per month for seven years, payable out of the monthly
revenues received by the City from the sewer connections
in the subdivisions.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was tried before the Honorable James S. Sawaya
"

1

"

"•"•
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without a jury who found for the Plaintiff-Respondent on the
basis of the contract.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals upon the grounds that recovery on the
contract is barred because of failure to comply with Statutory
requirements, that the Lower Court admitted oral testimony
varying the terms of written sewer extension contracts, and that
the evidence did not establish a contract.
Respondent seeks to sustain the Trial Court's determination
that there was a valid contract as a matter of lav; and of fact,
that Plaintiff complied with all conditions precedent to suit
and that there was no violation of the Parole Evidence Rule.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant has attempted in its Statement of Facts to emphasi
and state the evidence in favor of its own arguments, rather
than in accordance with the facts found by the Trial Court.
Thus, Plaintiff-Respondent sets forth below those facts which
fairly state the case.
In April, 1970, the Plaintiff-Respondent, Midwest, acquired
a tract of land which it later subdivided into Western Hills
No. 1 and Western Hills No. 2 Subdivisions.

(Ex. D-5)

The Subdivision Plats were submitted to the West Jordan
Planning Commission on July 7, 1970, were approved by the City
Engineer, Ivan Has lain, July 10, 1970, and presented to the City
Commission on August 6, 1970, at which time the Subdivisions were
2

•
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approved. (Ex. D-5)
Subdivision Western Hills No. 1 is situate on 7800
South and Subdivision Western Hills No. 2 is situate South
of No. 1.

Both Subdivisions are located West of the end of

the then existing City sewer line at 3200 West.

(Ex. P-l).

In order for Midwest to develop these new Subdivisions, it
was necessary to bring the sewer main from the end of the
City f s line at 3200 West, westerly along 7800 South to the
Subdivisions.
In early August Mr. Arch Coates, the Developer of the
Subdivisions for the Plaintiff for purposes of subdividing,
met with the City Council and obtained some preliminary
cost figures reflecting the cost of constructing the sewer
main along 7800 South.

(T. 60, 61)

Pie thereupon met with

the City Commission on August 4, 1970, and presented a
feasibility study based upon an estimated cost of $14,682.00
which would be paid back over a five year period.
Ex. P-4)

"(T. 62;

The City thereafter responded that the five year

period for the pay back was too short and asked that the
five years be extended to seven years.

(T. 65)

In subsequent

discussions the City and the Plaintiff agreed that the price
would be reduced to $1.50 per connection per month.

(T. 72)

The Plaintiff-Respondent submitted three bids (Exs. 9, 10
and 11) to the City Council on September 29, 1970, (Ex. P-13).
having received them from the City Engineer, Caldwell, Richards
and Sorenson. (T. 110-112)

Construction of the line began and

was completed some time in December, 1970, (T. 101) at which
,

-3 •

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

time the City Engineer informed the City that the sewer line
had been completed at a cost of $20,134.35, and recommended that
the City accept the sewer as part of the City collection system.
(Ex. 9)

House construction in the Subdivisions began in late

December, 1970, and continued over the next two years, ending
September 29, 1972, v/hen the last connections were made to the
sewer system.

(T. 129)

At various City Council meetings attended by representatives
of Midwest, the Plaintiff's pay back agreement was considered:
On February 2, 1971, the Council recognized
the existance of the original agreement.

The contract

form drawn up by the City Attorney was for $20,134.35
and the Council decided it should meet with the Officials
from Midwest to renegotiate the contract or to justify
the increased cost.

(Ex. P-14)

On August 3, 1971, a representative of Midwest
met with the City Council at which meeting the terms of
the original agreement were discussed.

The terms were:

$1.50 per month per unit for a period of seven years.
The Council agreed that it would have to stay with
that agreement.

(Ex. P-15)

On September 21, 1971, there was a general discussion
of pay-back agreements at the Council meeting and it
was suggested that the sewer charges be raised in order
to pay off the pay-back at a faster rate.

The Mayor

and the Council, indicating that it was for the benefit
of the City, agreed to the pay-back arrangement.
4
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(Ex. P-16)

On September 28, 1971, there was a full discussion
of the pay-back agreement and it was stated that a
tentative agreement had been reached with Mr. Coates
at the rate of $1.50 per month per connection for a
maximum of seven years.

Upon motion, properly seconded,

the Council unanimously voted that:
"We pay a maximum of $1.50 per month to the
Contractor. The Contractor's pay back would
terminate at the end of seven years, while the
pay back to the City would continue until the
obligation is paid....voting was unanimous in
the affirmative."
(Ex. P-17)
On October 5, 1971, the City adopted an Ordinance
No. 17A entitled,
"An Ordinance Amending Ordinance No. 17, Paragraph
Relating To Schedule Of Monthly Service Rates (In
City) Establishing The Monthly Sewer Fee For A Single
Dwelling Unit To Be Charged To Residents Of The City
Of West Jordan In Connection With The Pay Back
Agreement On Sewer Connections."
(Ex. P-18)•
On September 5, 1972, some three weeks prior to
the installation of the last sewer hookup in the Subdivisions,
which occurred on September 29, 1972, (T. 129) the City
Council once again considered the pay-back agreement.

At

this time Mr. Ray Green of Midwest explained in great
detail the history of the agreement.

The City Council

indicated that it could not give any

answer at that time,

and that the matter would have to be discussed later among
the Council Members and the Engineer.

(Ex. P-19)

Finally, on March 1, 1973, following a meeting of the
City Council on February 27, 1973, the pay-back agreement
in the amount of $20,134.35 was rejected by the unanimous
' •' 5 - .'
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vote of the Council.

(Ex. P-20)

This was the first

rejection and first denial of responsibility on the
part of the City.

(T. 127)

A history of the City's informal operating procedures in
considering and adopting resolutions, ordinances and contracts
is shown by the following:
The City Recordcnr, in this case Muriel Anderson,
acting as such since January 7, 1974, had custody of the
Minute Book of the City and also had custody of the City
Ordinances.

(T. 48, 55)

There are no signatures or

• ..

certificates affixed by the City Recorder even though
these are the official minutes and resolutions adopted
by the City Council.

(T. 50)

During 1970-1971 the

City contracts and agreements were not signed by the
City Recorder.

(T. 57)

Past contracts for the extension of culinary water
lines, etc., (Ex. P-25) were not countersigned by the
City Recorder, nor were contracts covering other subdivisions within the City of West Jordan. (T. 68)
The City had previously entered into other contracts
on October 6, 197 0 (Ex. D-2 3) where the agreement was
handled by mere motion, second and unanimous voting.
Even valid ordinances which the Defendant-Appellant
stipulated were the official ordinances . (T. 52; Ex. P-18)
are adopted without signature or without indication of the
voting, other than the statement "unanimous".
The City has been bound for many years by oral contracts
6
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with Caldwell, Richards and Sorenson for the rendering of
engineering services; and such contracts are neither signed
nor executed by the City.

(T. 54)

As each house in the subdivisions

was built and hooked up

to the sewer, the City began receiving $3.25 per month, per
house.

The value of the sewer main built by Midwest has been

added to the City's assets.

(T. 160)

The funds from the

monthly $3.25 charge go to pay for the 7800 South line as well
as for the interior Subdivision sewer systems.

(T. 158)

Finally, on May 17, 1973, of the Plaintiff's agreement,
the Plaintiff submitted a verified claim.
action was commenced July 13, 1973.

(Ex. P-21)

The

(T. 42)

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE AGREEMENT WITH THE CITY

IS NOT RENDERED INVALID

BY STATUTE.
A.

This is not a contract requiring posting and/or

publication of notice.
Appellant relies on Section 10-7-20 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, in arguing that this contract was one for public improvements,
and thus had to be open for public bidding after proper publication
of notice.
1.

There are several reasons why this argument fails:

The Statute expressly limits its application to those

improvements "to be paid for out of the General Funds of the City
or Town...".

It is clear that the pay back costs are not payable

out of the General Fund, but are to be paid out of the Utility
•

•

7
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Fund.

In the Minutes of September 28, 1971, we find the

following:
"The Mayor told the Councilmen that it would be
necessary to arrange a pay back agreement because
the General Fund is not set up to absorb this expense."
In the Minutes of September 21, 1971 (Ex. P-16) there is
a distinction made between the Utility Fund and the General
Fund.

The report of the City Accountant was that the

*

City was earning good money "from the utility operations".
These minutes a.lso indicate that the Accountant was trying to
determine if money could be transferee!

m the Utility Fund

reserve to the General Fr.nd, if it is held in restricted funds.
Reference is also made to the Ordinance enacted on October 5,
1971, (Ex. P-18) wherein the City specifically increases the
assessment from $3.25 to $4.75 to pay fo3: the pay back agreement on the sewer construction.

Also it is clear from the

testimony of the City Recorder and from Ordinance 4 2 (Ex. D-27)
that the money from the utilities goes into the Utility Fund.
(T. 152,158,159)
2.

The terms of the agreement itself indicate that the

payments are not to come from the General Fund at all, but are
to be taken from the fees collected from the use of the sewer
system.

Our Utah Supreme. Court has specifically held that this

Section does not apply to improvements to be paid for exclusively
out of the proceeds derived from the improvements themselves.
See

Barnes vs. Lehi City, 74 Utah 321, 279 P 878, Utah Power

and Light Company vs. Provo City, 94 Utah 203, 74 P 2d 1191.
3.

The Statute has specific language excepting from its
8
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Application the contracts for "making connection with water
mains or sewers.. . " .
4.

Additionally, but quite fundamentally, is the fact

that the contract is not one for the construction of a public
improvement.

Appellant in this case is the owner of the property,

is the constructor of the sewer systems, the water systems and
the sewer main, all of which are necessary for the development
of the two Subdivisions, and which are owned by the subdivider
until dedicated to the City.

There is no way that the Appellant,

Midwest, would be required to put up for bid the construction of
its own system.

The system is a requirement to be met in order

to develop the Subdivisions.

It is difficult to understand how

a public bidding concept would fit into the subdividers responsibility to furnish sewer and water.
Also, this is an agreement to repay the developer for
expenses he incurred in constructing the sewer main leading to
its Subdivisions.
bid.

There is nothing that could be put up for

If the reasonableness of the price were at issue, we

nevertheless have the City f s stipulation that the sum is reasonable.

Also, of course, the evidence is clear that the City was

notified before the work started of the three bids which had
been received by the City Engineer and turned over to the developer.
Then, finally the City Engineer himself approved and found said
costs of $20,134.35 proper.
B.

(T. 104; Exs. 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13)

Countersignature by the City Recorder is not required.

Appellant relies upon Section 10-10-61 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, as Amended, for the argument that since the City Recorder of
'

.

9

•••••
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the City of West Jordan did not countersign the contract between
the City and Midwest, the contract is invalid.

I

Respondent does

not believe that this Section of the Code has that effect on the
subject contract, and particularly is this so in view of the
historical methods of procedure followed by the City of West

I

Jordan, a City of the Third Class.

1

The definite thrust of this Statute is to the effect that
contract documents are involved and in existance and are signed
by someone.

I

Thereafter, the City Recorder must "countersign".

The word is defined in Blacks Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, at

I

page 4 21 as:

1

"COUNTERSIGN": As a noun, the signature of a
secretary or other subordinate officer to any
writing signed by the principal or superior to
vouch for the authenticity of it... (Cites cases);
and
As a verb, to sign in addition to the signature of
another in order to attest the authenticity.
(Cites
cases)."

i
I

I
I

Thus, in our case, we have no separate contract document
as such, previously signed by someone, but in fact have resolutions
or minutes of the City Council setting forth the contract.

There

actually is no document to which such a countersignature could
be affixed.

The purpose is obviously to authenticate the

particular separate document.

I
jj

This authenticity of our minutes and

resolutions is indicated in the testimony of the present City
Recorder who stated that these were the authentic resolutions and

1

records of the City even though there were no signatures of the

'

City Recorder affixed to any of the minutes included in the entire (
Minute Book, from which the particular minutes evidenced by the
1 0 ' •;.'
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Exhibits in this case were taken.

(T. 49-51)

No claim was

ever made by the City (until this lawsuit) that the agreement
failed for lack of a countersignature.

The City has never had

a countersignature of the Recorder on anything.
We think therefore that the duty of the City Recorder is a
ministerial duty imposed by this Section for purposes of authenticating certain contract documents, and this Section of the Code is
not intended to provide a governmental veto by the City Recorder,
nor is it intended to nullify the effect of resolutions and minutes,
together with the agreements set forth therein, duly adopted by
the City's Governing Board, it's City Council.
2.

The Utah Supreme Court in Cooper vs. Holder, 21 Utah

2d 40, 440 P 2d 115, states as is the case here that when,
"...(A) contract has been entered into for that purpose,
the City Council's function of policy making has been
fulfilled; and there then is no policy decision to be
made as to whether the City will pay what it owes for
the services received."
In

Richfield Cottonwood Irrigation Company vs. City of

Richfield, 84 Utah 107, 34 P 2d 945, this Court has specifically
held that minutes of the City Council are evidence of the facts
therein recired, stating,
fl

...(T)he minutes were kept by various Recorders of
the City. The law requires that such minutes be kept.
Rev. St. Utah 1933, 15-6-44. Being public records they
were competent evidence of the facts therein recited."
The legislative and governing body of cities of the Third
Class consist of the Mayor and City Council.
Code Annotated.

Section 10-6-5, Utah

The governing body shall meet, keep a journal of

its proceedings, and take a vote upon the passage of all ordinances
11
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1

and propositions creating liabilities against the City, and

I

shall enter the vote upon the journal of its proceedings.
Section 10-6-9.

The City Recorder for cities of the Third

I

Class is an appointive officer and that person shall also be

a

ex officio City Auditor.

*

Section 10-6-30.

Thus, it is

appropriate to note that the City Recorder is not a member of

I

the City Council and is not granted any voice in the governing
or legislative function of the City.

Quite obviously the City

1

Recorder has no veto power over the legislation adopted by

f

the City at its regular governing meetings.

'

The duties of the City Recorder are set forth in Section

I

10-10-60 wherein he is required to keep the papers and records
of the City, keep a record of the proceedings of the governing
body (City Council) and
body.

I

attend the meetings of the governing

There thus seems little doubt but that the City Council

enacts the governing and legislative pronouncements for the City

'
j

and that the City Recorder has a ministerial duty of authenticating
such agreements.

There is no requirement whatsoever that a City

J

has to reduce to a separate written contract form, any agreements
entered into.

The actions which bind the City are handled-at the '

Council Meetings and are set forth in the minutes, resolutions and 1
ordinances.
In our case, we have many Minutes of the City Council

j

extending back to August 1970 and continuing on through September .
1972, in which the agreement with the Plaintiff is discussed in
its various details.

'

However, specifically on September 28, 1971. I

(Ex. P-17) the City Council, after considerable discussion
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concerning the pay back agreement, took the following action:
"Mr. Hunt made the motion that we set the
pay back agreement at $1.50 per month to be
paid by the homeowner. Also, that we pay a
maximum of $1.50 per month to the contractor.
The contractor's pay back would terminate at
the end of seven years, while the pay back to
the City would continue until the obligation
is paid. Motion was seconded by Mr- Copeland.
Voting was unanimous in the affirmative."
Incidentally, Muriel Anderson, the City Recorder was present
at the meeting, although her status is not shown.

This meeting,

of course, occurred at a time when a substantial part of the
Subdivision had hooked up, and nine months after the main line
had been constructed and the cost thereof submitted to the City
Council by the City Engineer, under date of December 8, 1970.-'
(Ex. P-9)

Thus, we do have in addition to the various minutes

and meetings preceeding September 28, 1971, a reaffirmation in
writing properly voted upon and adopted unanimously at a regular
meeting of the governing body of the City of West Jordan of an
agreement to pay back $1.50 per month per connection extending over
a seven year period.

All of the Statutory requirements were met,

the minutes and the agreement have been authenticated by the City
Recorder, and although no separate contract document was prepared
and executed, and certainly no countersignature appears on such
document that was not executed, the City has properly acted.
One should not overlook the fact, also, that the City had
traditionally entered into agreements without any countersigning
by the City Recorder.

(T. 54, 57, 68; Ex. P-25)

The City

has, of course, adopted ordinances and resolutions involving
financial obligations on the part of the City even though there has
13
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been no countersignature on the part of the City Recorder.
(T. 48, 50)

See Sidney Stevens Implement Company vs. Ogden City,

83 Utah 578, 33 P 2d 181, for the holding that a City can be
bound by an implied contract which arises out of the general power
of the City under Section 15-7-1 R.S.V., 1933 which vests in it
the right and power to "make contracts and acquire and hold real
and personal property for corporate purposes."

This Section

is now, Section 10-7-1, Utah Code Annotated.
Although Appellant has not cited the case of Rapp vs. Salt
Lake City, 527 P 2d 651,

Utah

, we are aware of the case,

but believe that it is distinguishable from the subject case in
several respects.

First, the Rapp case is a tort action against

the City based upon misrepresentation, and in effect seeks to
impose an unjust, enrichment claim against the City regardless of
the intentions of the parties.

furthermore, the case in arguing

for unjust enrichment, attempts to set up contracts arising out
of an invitation to bid and a bid made pursuant thereto.

The case

was decided upon summary judgment without evidence upon many facet
of the case, and particularly as to whether or not the City
Recorder did countersign any agreement.

Quite obviously, where

there were no City Commission Minutes or Resolutions there would
have been no countersignature.

We believe that the Court v/as

merely indicating by dicta various elements which go to make up
statutory requirements of certain types of contracts and where
the contract in the Rapp case was implied in every sense of the
word, obviously the requirements were not met.
In our case, however, we have a definite course of action
14
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upon which the Plaintiff relied, which course of action was
represented by minutes and approvals by the City Council as
well as a formal resolution properly adopted, as has been indicated
above.

We think that the Rapp case therefore is not determinative

of our situation*
C.

Plaintiff-Respondent complied with Sections 63-30-13

-

and 10-7-77 Utah Code Annotated.
Appellant argues that the Plaintiff did not file a claim
within 90 days after the cause of action arose.

This point

simply involves a fact question, which the Lower Court has
decided.

Determining when the cause of action arises in a case

where no specific period of time has been agreed to for the
performance, becomes a question of reasonableness, which the
Trial Court must settle.

O f Hair vs. Counalis, 23 Utah 2d 355, 463

P 2d 799. In examining the evidence in this case, we conclude
that the Trial Court was justified in determining that the
Notice sent on May 17, 1973, (Ex. P-21) was within the 90 day
requirement of Section 63-30-13.
Beginning August of 1970, and continuing on through the
period up until September 1971, the parties met from time to
time in the Council meetings to solidify the pay-back agreement.
(Exs. P-13, P-14, P-15, P-16 and P-17)

On October 5, 1971, the

Council adopted Ordinance 17A to increase sewer rates so the
pay back obligation would be better funded.

(Ex. P-18)

Thereafter

in September, 1972, a further meeting was had at which the City
explained that the matter would have to be taken up again two
weeks hence.

(Ex. P-19)

Thereafter nothing occurred until a
" 15 :
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meeting on February 27, 1973 at which the City Council decided
to reject the agreement.

•

I

This rejection was given to the

Plaintiff by letter of March 1, 1973.

(Ex. P-20)

on May 17, the Notice was sent to the Appellant.

Thereafter,

'

(Ex. P-21)

Mr. Green, who was handling the affairs for Midwest,

J

testified that at no time had the City rejected his claim or

•

determined that it would not pay until he recieved the rejection
in March 1973.

(T. 127)

I

Therefore, it is reasonable to find that the Plaintiff had
every reason to believe that the contract was going to be

|

honored until he received the unequivocable rejection, March 1,

i

1973.
Appellant also claims that under Section 63-30-15 the action 1
must be commenced within one year after the denial.

It is

obvious that the Appellant in construing Sections 63-30-13 and

|

63-30-15 has overlooked Section 63-30-14.

j

Quite obviously the

provisions of 63-30-13 require the filing of a claim.

Section

63-30-14 provides that if the City does not approve or deny that
claim so filed within 90 days, then the claim shall be deemed to
have been denied.

Section 63-30-15 thereupon states that an

|

action must be commenced within one year after said denial.
Thus, we have the following sequence:

i

On March 1, 1973, the

City rejected the Plaintiff!s claim thus setting up the cause

1

of action.

On May 17, less than 90 days later the Plaintiff filed

its claim.

The action was then filed July 13, 197 3.

All of this I

shows compliance with the aforesaid Statutory requirements.

_'

i

Appellant also claims that Section 10-7-77 Utah Code
'
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i

Annotated was not followed and that the claim of Plaintiff
is barred*

Section 10-7-77 is a one year Statute of Limitations

relating to the filing of claims.

It obviously conflicts with

Section 63-30-13 and having been re-enacted in its present
form in 1973, would seem to have preference over Section 63-30-13.
However, assuming that the claimant must meet both Statutes it is
clear from the record that September 29, 197 2, is the date that the
last connection was made to the sewer system, and that the $1.50
monthly pay back on that connection would have then commenced
running and would run for seven years.

Strictly speaking, of

course, the last accrued item would not occur for seven years.
However, assuming a position most favorable to the Appellant,
the one year could in no event elapse
1973.

sooner than September 2.9,

On the other hand, if the claim accrued when it was denied

March 1, 1973, then Plaintiff-Respondent had until March 1, 1974,
in which to file its claim.

Thus, there is no interpretation of

the facts and evidence which could justify any claim that
Section 10-7-77 has been violated.

The claim itself is verified

and meets the requirements of the Statute.
In summary, Respondent submits that the Statutes have been
met, the claim properly filed and the action timely initiated.
D#

'

The method of voting for a resolution under Section

10-6-9, Utah Code Annotated, has been met.
There is no doubt but that the August 4, 1970 presentation
to the Council by Mr. Coates (Ex. *P~4; T. 72, 72, 80-90)

does

not meet the requirements of Section 10-6-9, Utah Code Annotated.
However, subsequent Council meetings leading up to September 28,
• •
•
1 7J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1971, indicate the Council's full examination and understanding

n

of the problem resulting in the enactment by unanimous affirmative *
vote on September 28, 1971 of the proposition.

The phrase, "votinc
i

was unanimous in the affirmative"/ can only mean that everyone
present voted yea.

It seems rather fundamental that where the

voting is unanimous the yeas and the nays have been counted.

|
•

The minutes of the meeting show the six members present, including
the Mayor, show the Motion made by Council Member Hunt, show the

I

Motion seconded by Council Member Copeland and show that the voting
was unanimous in the affirmative,

(Ex. P-17)

Furthermore,

]

Muriel Anderson testified that this was the procedure followed

i

by the Council in all of its meetings and that if the voting
of all members was affirmative that the minutes reflected all
yeas voting unanimously.

(T. 163)

1

An examination of other

ordinances, concerning which there is no question as to the

|

validity thereof, shows that this was a uniform practice of

i

reflecting yeas and nays.
so adopted.

(Ex. P-18)

Ordinance No. 17A was

Thus, the yeas and nays were properly recorded at

the meeting at which the pay-back agreement was approved.
E.

•

The pay-back agreement satisifies the Statute of Frauds. |

The writings upon which Plaintiff relies, are of course the

j

minutes and resolutions adopted by the City Council and particularly the minutes of September 28, 1972. (Ex. P-17)

These

I

minutes are sufficient writings to comply with the Statute.
Richfield Cottonwood Irrigation Company vs. City of Richfield, supr|
Public records are a sufficient memorandum to comply with
the Statute of Frauds.

The municipal corporation acts through
1

8

"

••;•,.•

•

:
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its governing body and those actions are expressed in the
minutes and resolutions.

See 72 American Jurisprudence

paragraph 306 and the cases cited therein.
The minutes involved here are the official minutes and
resolutions of the City and are properly authenticated by the
Recorder.

Courts will not search for technicalities to defeat

rights, but will give liberal interpretation to minutes which
may be carelessly or inadequately kept by a municipality.
Stevens vs. Muskegon, 111 Mich. 72, 6 9 N . W . 227.

POINT II
NO ORAL EVIDENCE MODIFIED THE TERMS OF WRITTEN SEWER
EXTENSION CONTRACTS.
Plaintiff introduced Exhibit 25 consisting of water and
sewer extension application agreements to show other contracts
entered into by the City without the formality of countersignature
of the City Recorder.

The content of the documents indicates

clearly that they relate to the extensions in the Subdivisions.
They do not relate to the construction of the sewer main.
They obviously relate to applications for sewer and water
extensions and indicate the number of copies,

that maps of

the areas were required, the guarantees required and other
details.

There is a sewer extension application and a water

extension application for each Subdivision.
Mrs. Anderson, quoted so extensively by Appellant at page
33 of his Brief, testified on cross examination that she couldn't
say definitely whether or not these agreements related to the
'•19
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sewer main,

(T, 139)

She obviously was asked by Defendant's

(

Counsel to give a legal opinion. (T. 138)

."

The letter of transmittal from the City Engineers (Ex. P-26) *
4

shows by the percentage fee figures that the contract figures are
unrelated to the main line construction.

I

In any event, the written minutes of the City do not constitute
oral testimony contradicting or varying the terms of these extensidf
application agreements.

I

POINT III
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDING

.

THAT THERE WAS A CONTRACT.
The City received the benefit of a sewer main at the cost of J
$20,134.35; it received the value of added tax base in terms
of the homes in the Subdivisions; it received the revenue

|

from the monthly sewer payments of $3.25.

.

(T. 150, 160)

The clear intent of the resolution passed by the City
is that the cost previously given to the City in 1970 would
be repaid at the rate of $1.5 0 per house, per month.

'
I

The

Trial Court had sufficient evidence to find a contract existed

|

to repay the sum of $20,134.35, the reasonable cost of

.

constructing the sewer.

'

Respondent respectfully urges that

the Trial Court Judgment be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

Elliott' tee Pratt
Attorney for Respondent
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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